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struggles for citizenship, democracy and human rights in Eastern Asian societies. 
Discussions of citizenship need to be sensitive to these struggles which are still very much 
issues of Eastern Asian politics.
Keywords: citizenship, revolution, nation-building, China, Japan, Korea
 * I am grateful to Prof. Dongyoun Hwang for his comments, and his help with Korean 
terminology.
 **Retired from University of Oregon in 2006.
DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY
Volume 39 | Number 2 | December 2010, 187-210
188 DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIETY, Vol. 39 No. 2, December 2010
Introduction
Accompanying the rise to global hegemony of the nation-state as the 
political form the state assumed under the regimes of capitalism and inter-
state competition, more often than not by force of arms, citizenship has 
become a nearly universal marker of political subjecthood. The Euro/
American re-invention in the 18th century of an idea that had originated in 
the city-states of ancient Greece relocated citizenship from the “city” (or an 
Empire extending out of a city, as in Rome) in the nation-state, with 
contradictory consequences. It gave the “citizen” a say in the organization and 
functions of the state, opening the promise of democratic government to an 
ever-widening range of constituencies. It also inaugurated an unprecedented 
penetration of everyday life by the state, and the expansion of the space of the 
political, that would culminate in the ascendancy of what Michel Foucault 
described as “biopolitics,” understood broadly as the regulation of human life 
and behavior at the everyday level (Foucault, 2008). Foucault perceived 
“biopolitics” as a characteristic of Euromodernity, regardless of the form the 
state took in different nations in response to particular social and ideological 
circumstances. We might suggest, likewise, that the contradictory 
consequences of the remaking of “subjects” as “citizens” are equally universal, 
and have played an important part in shaping the politics of societies 
worldwide over the last two centuries or so. Varied as paths of nation-
building and practices of citizenship may be across regional and national 
divides, this fundamental contradiction is integral to the variation, rendering 
the problematic of citizenship universal despite these differences.  
Eastern Asian societies (including East and much of Southeast Asia) are 
no exception. The contradictory demands of nation-building and citizenship 
have propelled the political course of these societies for over a century, a 
considerable part of that period in collisions with one another, including war 
and colonialism. The resolution of the contradiction would take different 
forms in the different societies, from Fascism in Japan to a totalistic left 
Party-State in China, to authoritarian states in Korea, Vietnam, and others in 
the aftermath of experiences with colonialism from without and within the 
region. Nevertheless, the image of a generalized authoritarian state in keeping 
with the cultural legacies of the region should not disguise the simultaneous 
presence of struggles for democratic rights and citizenship. That these 
struggles seem to be overtaken across the region by a more economically 
inflected state-society relationship does not render continued struggle for 
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democratic rights any the less relevant. How we bring together these struggles 
with the state’s version of the nation has discursive political implications. No 
discussion of citizenship is politically innocent. This may be all the more the 
case in discussions of Eastern Asian societies where  struggles for citizenship 
remained unfinished when the political context was transformed rapidly by 
incorporation in a globalizing neoliberal economy.    
My argument runs counter to the search for an East Asian difference 
that is based on the assumption of difference in cultural legacies, not because 
I think that cultural propensities and practices are unimportant, but 
because culture itself has very much been an issue in struggles over 
citizenship in the societies of the region, and therefore does not serve well in 
the explanation of difference when it needs itself to be explained. In other 
words, the question of culture needs to be historicized: if past legacies play a 
part in the meaning and function attached to citizenship in different 
societies, struggles over citizenship are important to understanding the 
production of new cultural meanings that reshape the political terrain. The 
“cultural turn” since the 1980s has deflected scholarly attention away from the 
entanglement of citizenship and nation-building in societies of this region in 
the experience of colonialism, hegemony, revolution and development, 
erasing citizenship as a historical problem in a culturalist leveling of history, 
and with it the political struggles that have shaped the trajectories of these 
societies. Insistence on cultural difference as the criterion for differences in 
practices of citizenship, whatever the reasoning underlying it, is hardly free of 
political consequences, as it wittingly or unwittingly favors some notions of 
citizenship over others-more often than not conservative against more 
democratic ideas of citizenship, based on one or another version of national 
characteristics. 
This qualification has significant implications for spatializations 
informed by culture, in this case, an “east Asian culture,” more often than not 
associated with a common Confucian legacy. It suggests that if Eastern Asian 
societies may constitute a region, it is not because they share one or more 
cultural traditions in common, but because their interactions over the last 
century have endowed them with certain commonalities-no less as 
antagonists as political and cultural models. These interactions have been 
crucial in the production of national self-images, as well as in shaping state-
society relations that lie at the crux of the citizenship problematic. 
Finally, we need to guard against the reification of regions and their 
differences that often accompanies regional comparisons. Comparison of 
Eastern Asia with European and North American practices of citizenship 
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needs to remain mindful of significant differences internal to both of these 
areas. Above all, it needs to be cognizant that, despite differences in culture, 
social formations and political legacies, there may be significant 
commonalities between Eastern Asian societies and societies in other regions 
of the world than the European or American, that may be due to parallel 
historical trajectories of nation-building and practices of citizenship under 
Euro/American hegemony. The perspective of the world is also indispensable 
in avoiding entrapment in an East-West abridgement of the world which 
does not stand up to even minimal critical inquiry, but which refuses to go 
away nevertheless as it seems to satisfy urges to civilizational preeminence 
(on both sides). The juxtaposition constitutes a gross misrepresentation of 
global spaces, and impoverishes the possibilities of historical explanation. 
A Note on Citizenship and the Nation-state
Citizenship has come under a great deal of critical scrutiny in recent 
years, accompanying increased awareness of the apparent inability of the 
nation-state to control its borders against flows of capital and people, the 
withdrawal of the state from the provision of social rights with neo-liberal 
privatization, and increased state suspicion and surveillance of its population 
with the pervasive anxiety about terror, on the one hand, and, on the other 
hand, the proliferation of claims on citizenship. Demands on the state have 
proliferated with the diffusion from Europe and North America of a sense of 
rights that are no longer containable within earlier categories of civil, political 
and economic rights. In its putative rejection of state intervention in the 
economy, neoliberalism has created problems that have made state 
intervention more important than ever. Different notions of citizenship are in 
the process of evolving out of the practices of migrant populations. 
Rather than make the state irrelevant, these developments invite the state 
even deeper into the social veins of everyday life. They nevertheless have 
raised serious questions concerning both citizenship and the nation-state. 
The inside/outside distinction that lies at the core of  citizenship as its 
defining feature has come under criticism for the abuses it has generated, as 
well as introducing parochially-informed divisions into human society. On 
the other hand, proliferating demands for civil and social rights have revealed 
how citizenship throughout its history has failed to live up to its promise of 
equal treatment for all citizens. Seeming loss of faith in citizenship has been 
expressed in calls for “unthinking citizenship” for its complicity in curtailing 
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the rights of significant groups in society by casting a veneer of formal 
equality over the reality of a diverse set of inequalities in society (Gouws, 
2005; Stevenson, 2001). Much of this discussion, we may add, is framed with 
an acute awareness of issues raised by globalization and transnationalism, 
most importantly the weakening, irrelevance, and possibly the demise of the 
nation-state.
Citizenship has taken another hit with questions concerning the nation 
as a source of identity and a unit of solidarity from the recognition of 
national “cultural complexity” (Hannerz, 1992) that transnational migrant 
cultures have forced on national consciousness across the globe. “Cultural 
citizenship” that earlier denoted the right to partake of a commonly shared 
hegemonic national culture refers presently to the right of ethnic groups to 
their own cultures (and languages), undermining assumptions about national 
cultural homogeneity, and expectations of cultural assimilation as a condition 
of citizenship (Turner, 1997: 12; Faist, 2000: 211-217; Rosaldo, 1997; 
Benhabib, 2002: Ch. 6; Kymlicka, 2001). Cultural complexity enjoys legal or 
quasi-legal codification in the recognition given to “dual citizenship” in an 
increasing number of states, the extension of citizenship status of one kind or 
another to “nationals” residing outside of the boundaries of the nation-state, 
and the formal or informal adoption of multiculturalist policies (Ibid.; Glick 
Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton, 1992; Levitt, 2001; Pries, 1999). The 
superimposition of transnational on national spaces deterritorializes the 
nation, and “de-couples” identity from citizenship (Delanty, 2000: 131). The 
result, ironically, is to further enhance the role of the state in the dispensation 
of national belonging.  
Critiques of citizenship fall short to the extent that they ignore their own 
context within a legally codified national belonging that is also their 
condition. While the politics of citizenship require that analysis look beyond 
legal formalities, the legal definition of citizenship “as a collection of rights 
and obligations which give individuals a formal legal identity” (Turner, 
1997a: 5) is equally a requisite as a point of departure for any analysis 
grounded in political reality. No matter how varied the meaning and 
definition of citizenship, its legal codification in the constitution of the 
nation-state is a pervasive, if not universal, condition of modern citizenship 
(Faist, 2000: 207-208). While codification privileges those who belong against 
outsiders who do not, it does not make up for internal inequalities, and may 
even end up adding the legitimation of law to inequality (Bueker, 2009: 423). 
Still, the legal affirmation of belonging, even where it does not bring any 
recognizable advantages, has served as a powerful adhesive in securing 
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identification with the nation and its state.1  
The privilege that comes with citizenship, if only legally, is also 
empowering in authorizing those who qualify as citizens or potential citizens 
to challenge both the boundaries of belonging, and unequal distribution of 
economic, political, social and cultural rights. Indeed, in those societies 
where the rule of law has not been subjected to political restrictions, 
citizenship historically has acquired new dimensions and new meanings as a 
result of such challenges, which make possible a politics of citizenship as 
distinct from its legal definitions, although the one is intimately bound with 
the other: if political struggles have secured citizenship for those excluded 
from it or marginalized by it, those struggles have drawn legitimacy from the 
promise of equality that is implicit in the very notion of citizenship (Isin, 
2002). Citizenship may not guarantee democracy, but democracy as we have 
known it may have been impossible without it. Indeed, it is possible to 
suggest, I think, that most critiques of citizenship either on the basis of its 
exclusions or the inequalities it disguises, are struggles for inclusion and 
greater equality of rights-in other words, struggles over and for citizenship 
(Calhoun, 2007).
This automatically raises the question of the nation-state, the 
organizational and cultural context of modern citizenship. Citizenship means 
above all citizenship in the nation, “national citizenship,” which may be the 
reason that an earlier generation of scholars such as T.H. Marshall, less 
concerned with globality, did not even bother to specify that the citizenship 
they discussed took the nation-state for granted (Marshall, 1992: 9; Crowley, 
1998: 168). This indeed has been the case until recently, when there have 
been tendencies to disjoin citizenship and the nation-state. In his 
contribution to the conference on which this volume is based, Brian Turner 
reflects self-critically that in his preoccupation with social citizenship, he did 
not in the past attend closely to issues of national citizenship (Turner, 2009). 
We might go further and observe that the suggestion of parity between the 
social and the national is also misleading, as national citizenship is not just 
one more form of citizenship but historically has provided the context that 
enabled the expansion of the scope of citizenship to civil, political, social, 
economic and cultural rights. It is within the same context that understanding 
of these categories has expanded as the equality promised by national 
citizenship-the entitlements of citizenship-has encouraged struggles for full 
1 For the epochal change of the concept represented in the writing of the American constitution, 
see Kaufman (2010).
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citizenship rights of excluded and marginalized groups in society (such as 
social citizenship, for instance, which has gone beyond issues of class to issues 
of identity politics). Rather than independent forms of citizenship, in other 
words, the various guises in which citizenship rights have been framed have 
represented so many dimensions of national citizenship. 
If they are to serve as alternatives to “national citizenship,” the rephrasing 
of these rights as forms of citizenship requires specification of the 
organizational configuration other than the nation that would be attendant 
upon the reconstitution of the space of citizenship (what would be the 
organizational context, in other words, that would guarantee the priority of 
social citizenship-or any other form of citizenship?). This might range from 
the local community, at one extreme, to a global human community, at the 
other, with many possibilities in between (Turner, 1997a). Any consideration 
of alternatives to the nation-state needs to be aware of the limitations placed 
on choice by its own context in historical circumstances shaped by the 
nation-state, which may be a historical invention but is not, therefore, any the 
less significant in shaping history. We may also note that while the nation-
state inflicted much damage on the local community in the process of 
colonizing it, it also corrected much abuse within it. At the other extreme, 
Craig Calhoun has argued following Hannah Arendt that human rights were 
most effectively protected where they have a firm basis in citizenship 
(Calhoun, 2007: 4). It is also necessary to add that citizenship itself has been 
most democratic and egalitarian when it has made human rights its own. The 
one need not exclude the other, even if such exclusion were possible. 
The nation-state is important for another reason: as a platform for 
participating in global issues. Stateless societies such as those that are the 
subject of James Scott’s recent work, or parts of national societies that 
renounce the state, serve best to drop out of world politics, more often than 
not at great peril to their constituencies who for better or worse are deprived 
of the protective umbrella of the state (Scott, 2009; NTS Alert, 2010). 
Participation requires access to institutions beyond the local.  There are many 
channels for this kind of activity, social possibilities in global movements as 
well as technological possibilities, such as the internet, but given the decision-
making powers of the state, it still provides the most effective institutional 
means for popular access to global politics. As in the case of human rights, a 
sense of globality is necessary for national citizenship to reach out to global 
politics, or even global citizenship, at least in a symbolic sense. The point is, 
however, that the national and the global are not mutually exclusive, but play 
out their dialectic under the force of a variety of constituencies. The one 
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might even contribute to strengthening the demands of the other.    
Much of the criticism of citizenship in recent years has been driven by a 
sense of the impending demise of the nation-state under the assault of 
irresistible forces of globalization, primarily economic, but also political, 
social and cultural. Regionalization of sovereignty in a supra-national 
organization such as the European Union, where seen as a pervasive 
tendency, has lent an aura of historical inevitability to the ultimate 
replacement of the nation-state by a higher form of organization. Indeed, 
there has been talk even in policy quarters since the 1990s that world society 
is in the process of reconfiguration, most importantly in a “network society” 
consisting of networks of cities that cut across national boundaries, in a 
manner reminiscent of the pre-national commercial configuration of cities 
such as the Hanseatic League in Europe and the less formal network of cities 
that extended from Eastern to Southwestern Asia until their disruption of 
European imperial expansion (Dirlik, 1993: 50). It is arguable that at least as a 
tendency of the present, networks are replacing surfaces (identified with the 
nation) as the loci of economic, political and cultural power. The 
disappearance of the countryside looms ever closer as the countryside pours 
into the slums of megacities. And what could be a nation without the 
countryside?
Whether or not this makes the “state” of the nation-state irrelevant is an 
entirely different matter. Fashionable clichés that privilege motion and 
mobility over stable identities and stationary existence do not do away with 
either the state or the nation. By far the vast majority of the global 
population, including the academic purveyors of such clichés, continue to 
live in nations governed by nation-states that are as jealous of their 
prerogatives as they have ever been (Bloemraad, 2004). Most also enjoy the 
privileges that come with national belonging, if in a hierarchy of rights and 
obligations (Butcher, 2010).    
Predictions of the demise of the nation-state rarely distinguish the “state” 
and the “nation-state,” often using them interchangeably, possibly because of 
the ease with which it is possible to mistake the disarticulation of state and 
the nation for the decline of one and the weakening of the other. But all the 
evidence points to a prevalent tendency presently that while the ties that bind 
the citizen to the state may be dissolving, the state is also enjoying 
unprecedented concentration of power over the citizenry. Indeed, it may be 
suggested that both internally and externally, the state has had to add an 
expanding scope of managerial activity to its other functions: from managing 
capital flows to the management of people flow, externally, and the 
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management of  social and cultural relations internally, down to the level of 
the family. The apparent intensification of citizenship in the embrace of the 
state only serves to disguise the alienation at work of the state from the 
citizenry as its very centrality in the management of global relations more 
than ever distances it from the population of which it is the putative 
representative. Indeed, citizenship itself has become an object of management 
in response to corporate economic needs and popular pressures (Ong, 2003). 
Nationalism these days is as much against as it is for the state, which may 
express the ambiguity of the state as the mediator of the global and the 
national. But it by no means offers evidence of decline in the power of the 
state per se.
This being the case, there is as much reason presently to struggle for 
citizenship in the nation-state as to struggle against it, and, depending on 
circumstances, to recover or establish the rights of citizenship that are 
usurped, denied, or abridged by the state. Needless to say, these struggles 
come in many political colorings. Right-wing movements that primordialize 
relations between the state and the citizen, even where they wish “to drown 
the state in a bathtub,” as in the case of primitivist libertarians in the United 
States, have drawn the most attention for their propensity to advocate 
oppressive measures against those they perceive as threats to national unity 
and homogeneity. But the struggle for citizenship is by no means restricted to 
the political and cultural right. Movements for rights that are distinguished 
by a more-open ended understanding of citizenship, despite their criticism of 
existing codifications and practices of citizenship, do not seek to abolish 
citizenship, but to make it more democratic, egalitarian and inclusive.. These 
movements recognize, in most cases anyway, that if what is required is to 
reconfigure citizenship to overcome its exclusivist limitations under the 
nation-state, and disperse citizens’ sovereignties among multiple belongings, 
that, too, needs to confront the political topography that is the legacy of the 
nation-state system. Articulating these struggles to one another is the 
challenge facing citizenship as a political project. If they are to accomplish 
their goals, and overcome the drift to the right, progressive struggles for 
citizenship need to answer the anxieties of populations facing a 
reconfiguration of citizenship that threatens the security provided earlier by 
the assumption of intimate ties between citizen, nation and the state, however 
problematic or illusory they may have been. 
As this analysis suggests, the citizenry is not a unified or a homogeneous 
entity. Indeed, it is inequalities in the rights and obligations that define the 
relationship of citizens to the state that motivate struggles for full citizenship 
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on the part of those who feel that they have been denied in practice the rights 
that are theirs, or should be theirs, by virtue of being citizens. The struggle for 
citizenship is at one and the same time also a struggle for economic, political, 
social and, more recently, cultural citizenship-among the citizenry itself. This 
itself contributes to the power of the state as the ultimate arbiter of such 
struggles. On the other hand, if the citizenry is not unified or homogeneous, 
neither is the state, even where that term refers in a narrow sense to the 
structure of government, let alone the complex of institutions that are 
devoted to the sustenance of the existing political order that constitute the 
state in a broader sense. Even those states that seek to establish themselves 
over and above the citizenry are riddled with contradictions on the disposition 
of citizenship as they are caught between the demands of a globalizing 
political economy and those of national sovereignty which would be 
meaningless without a nation to ground it. The seeming inability of states in 
our day to find solutions of any promise of permanence to problems thrown 
up by citizenship offers prima facie evidence of a critical uncertainty over 
inherited practices of both sovereignty and citizenship.    
Culture and Citizenship: A Historical Perspective on Problems 
of Citizenship in Eastern Asia
These issues of citizenship appear also in the struggles for citizenship in 
Eastern Asian societies, albeit with local variations and nuances. In a review 
of a volume of essays devoted to analysis of the contemporary relevance of T.
H. Marshall’s “paradigm” of citizenship, Brian Turner wrote that,
…social and economic rights need not be co-joined with juridical and 
political rights in an evolutionary framework…successful development of 
Marshall’s original paradigm will require specific attention to the question of 
the globalization of the economy and secondly to the resulting cultural 
ambiguities of identity. It is for this reason that cultural citizenship in the 
global economy is the most pressing issue for those concerned with the 
enhancement of Marshall’s theoretical legacy in citizenship studies (Turner, 
1997b: 178-179).
In his contribution to the present volume, Turner himself stresses the 
importance of the Confucian legacy in East Asian societies as a “structural 
constraint” on citizenship (Turner, 2009). 
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The teleological ordering of Marshall’s three dimensions in the 
expansion of citizenship rights and practices (civil, political, and social) is one 
more instance of a misleading theoretical universalization of a particular 
instance of historical development (Great Britain); much the same as the 
universalization of Marx’s account of the progressive unfolding of social 
formations in European history. In both cases, the problem lies in the 
sociologization of historical categories, for which the original accounts are 
partially responsible in their failure to specifiy the historicity and historical 
context of their categories. Recent scholarship, including Turner’s, 
acknowledges that there is no inevitability to these various dimensions of 
citizenship, or to a necessary order in the conception and juridical recognition 
of citizenship rights. Neither are they sufficient, from a contemporary 
perspective, to cover the realm of citizenship, which has acquired additional 
dimensions over the years. Recognition of historical particularity is a necessity 
of addressing both issues.
Similar considerations apply to the issue of culture, which has acquired 
analytical prominence in the humanities and the social sciences with the 
“cultural turn” of the last three decades. itself a response to a renewed 
insistence on cultural persistence and particularity that, ironically, has 
accompanied the globalization of capitalist modernity economically as well as 
culturally with the disappearance of revolutionary spaces (Dirlik, 2007: Ch. 
3). I referred above to the recognition of “cultural complexity” domestically 
that has provoked the recent interest in culture, nation and citizenship. The 
implications of cultural difference between societies for citizenship (as 
constraint, as Turner suggests, or as the still further expansion of its realm, 
that a global perspective raises as a possibility) are equally important. 
How to bring culture into the analysis of citizenship, however, is easier 
said than done as culture itself is one of the most abused concepts in 
scholarship or politics in its vulnerability to ahistorical — de-temporalized, 
de-spatialized, and de-socialized — reification. One aspect of the problem 
that is particularly pertinent to the discussion here is the part that agency 
(including the nation-state) plays in foregrounding the culture question; in 
other words, whether culture is an attribute of a society that is reproduced 
from generation to generation without conscious design, is consciously 
promulgated by agents who have an ideological, social and political stake in 
its persistence, or both, depending on what aspect of culture we might have 
in mind. The distinction is crucial to sorting out the different and conflicting 
ideas of citizenship, as well as the political struggles they generate, products 
both of contemporary structural contradictions that are every bit as significant 
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as the historical legacies that may inform the particularities of those 
contradictions. This is not to deny the importance of cultural practices. 
Rather the question is the deployment of culture in historical explanation as 
if it were an immutable “thing” immune to history; to transformation itself in 
the process of assimiliating new ideas and practices. 
It has become commonplace since the 1980s to identify an East Asian 
culture sphere defined by a shared legacy of Confucianism, which is more a 
product of efforts to explain the economic success of societies within the 
region than of their cultural realities. These societies were culturally complex 
before their incorporation in a Euro/American capitalist order. While they 
shared in common the textual traditions of Confucianism, they were also 
distinguished from one another by additional cultural affiliations that ranged 
from Daoism, Shinto, and Shamanism, to varieties of Buddhism, not to speak 
of more localized cultural practices (Dirlik, 1995, 2008). On the other hand, 
to point to something vague like the prevalence of family values is 
reductionist both of complex kinship organizations or of Confucianism as 
political theory and practise. Family values are hardly a monopoly of East 
Asian Confucianism. Besides, stress on the family in and of itself does not 
automatically yield clues to kinship organization, which took different forms 
in different societies (and different regions of the same society), especially in 
their incorporation into political order. 
It is equally plausible to ascribe East Asian modernities to particular 
modes of incorporation in regional and global modernities, to shared legacies 
of colonialism or, as in the case of China, to new values generated by 
revolutionary social transformation (Cumings, 1984). Why Confucianism 
should be singled out as an explanation of success, or a formative moment of 
regional modernity, when it had been under attack for a hundred years (even 
longer in Japan) as an impediment to modernity, is a problem, not an 
explanation. It points to the possibility that, rather than a legacy that defines 
the nature of citizenship in East Asia, Confucianism as the source of a 
culturally defined citizenship represents only one alternative among others, 
congenial to some social and political interests, but not to others, as is 
suggested by the Confucian revival that accompanied the retreat from 
revolution in China from the late 1970s. Historically, struggles over culture in 
Eastern Asian societies have been part and parcel of the struggles for 
citizenship. 
As I suggested above in the introductory section, there are good 
historical reasons for thinking of Eastern Asia as a region, albeit with shifting 
boundaries, and structural forces internal and external to the region. The 
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states that constitute the region nevertheless have their own particular 
histories despite the common legacies they may claim (or may be ascribed to 
them), shaped as much by their relationship to the world outside the region 
as by their mutual interactions, especially with the disintegration of regional 
coherence from the late 19th century with the forced incorporation of the 
region in worldwide political developments. Imperialism, justified as the 
enforcement of a new international order based on legally equal sovereign 
states, put an end to the hierarchical tributary practices that had defined an 
earlier Eastern Asian world, replacing them with a new hierarchy of power 
that included the colonization of those deemed unqualified for national 
sovereignty. Meiji Japan was the only one to escape colonization, even though 
the threat of it served as a powerful stimulus for political transformation. It 
rapidly became a colonizer itself in Korea and Taiwan. Qing China came 
under the domination of a concert of powers. The British, the French, the 
Dutch, and the United States colonized Southeast Asia (the Malay Peninsula, 
Vietnam Indonesia and the Philippines, respectively). 
Nationalist movements that arose in response, inspired by the new idea 
of the sovereign nation-state, would contribute further to the disintegration 
of existing regional relationships, and to their replacement by a new set of 
relationships now conceived around the nation-state, which included intra-
regional imperialism and colonialism. More significantly, nationalist 
reconceptualization of politics had radical consequences across the region. 
Euro/American colonialism, or the threat it presented, was instrumental in 
provoking efforts to remake the monarchical states of the region into nation-
states, which required as a fundamental condition the transformation of the 
relationship between rulers and the ruled, which now found a new resolution 
in the concept of citizenship, imported from Euro/America along with the 
nation-form. 
The assimilation of citizenship was a crucial moment in the transformation 
of East Asian polities from the late 19th century. The circumstances of these 
societies lent particular urgency to the speedy creation of a modern nation 
and a strong state. Chang Kyung-sup has used the term “compressed modernity” 
to describe the compression of modernization into a short temporality in an 
environment of Euro/American colonialism and domination (Chang, 2010). 
The urgent problems “compressed modernization” presented brought into 
sharp relief the ambivalent relationship between state and citizenship 
discussed above. Chief among those problems was the role the state was 
expected to play in the cause of development, a widely desired goal that 
nevertheless was also problematic, as it would strengthen the state over the 
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citizens, which conflicted with simultaneous demands for citizens’ rights, and 
even the assumption that loyal citizens were necessary to the building of a 
strong state. Nation-building and citizenship were each the condition for the 
other. But they also presented a fundamental contradiction in the demands 
each made on the other: ranging from the incorporation of citizens within 
the body politic represented by the state, at one extreme, to the total (if 
theoretical) rejection of the state at the other, as was the case with anarchism, 
which called for community citizenship based on voluntary association, free 
from the structures of political or social authority. 
The contradiction was common to all societies in the region, as it has 
been to nation-building processes everywhere, if not with equal intensity. It 
was exacerbated by a situation where neither nation nor nation-state existed, 
and each was responsible for the creation of the other. It took a nation to 
make a nation-state, while the nation-state bore the responsibility for creating 
the nation, making citizens out of a population that had no conception of 
what it took to be one (Wang, 1997: 267-269). The relationship between 
nation and citizen was not transparent either, as collective notions of 
citizenship that submerged the individual within larger collective wholes 
could coexist with more individualistic, liberal ideas. The ambiguity may be 
visible in disagreements over terminology. Unlike the terms nation and 
citizen, with their different referents, the term guomin (or its Japanese and 
Korean equivalents, kokumin or gukmin) were used to refer at once to citizen 
and national (literally, “people of the nation/state”) (Shen, 2006), suggesting a 
more collective notion of citizenship than in liberal theory. A kinship 
coloring was cast on the idea of nation almost from the beginning as it 
assumed an ethnic mantle (minzu, minzoku, or minjok). The ethnic 
conception of the nation conflicted with the more political conception 
around the term guojia (kokka/gukga). While family metaphors persisted in 
defining the relationship between state and society, moreover, the new 
politics demanded that the public obligations of the citizen overcome 
particularistic loyalties to the family in the name of higher loyalties to the 
nation (Doak, 1997; Fogel and Zarrow, 1997; Gluck, 1985; Hirai, 1987; Kim, 
2007; Pyle, 1969; Shen, 2006).
Such complexities made citizenship into a site of contention and 
experimentation, with different outcomes in different societies. The priority 
the state assumed in the initial phase of this transformation has persisted over 
the years, but with important variations over time. The transformation 
occurred with the greatest speed in Japan, which subsequently served as a 
model of development for other societies in the region. Japanese political 
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discourse bequeathed a new vocabulary (neologisms of ancient Chinese 
characters) for the nationalist reconceptualization of politics. A new 
international generation of Eastern Asian radicals gathering in Tokyo played 
no little part in spreading these ideas even as Japan engaged in colonialist 
activities in the region (Karl, 2002).   
The instrumentalization of citizenship in the cause of national “wealth 
and power” was a conspicuous feature of late 19th century politics in all of 
the societies of the region, and not just among those who spoke for the state. 
The incorporation of the citizen in the body politic of the nation represented 
by the Emperor in Meiji Japan was a project of nationalist reformers, but also 
found enthusiastic acquiescence among the population at large. In response 
to popular unrest in the 1880s, the government imposed a familial metaphor 
over the nation, rendering the already divine emperor also into the father of 
the nation (Lo and Bettinger, 2001). The state also assumed the responsibility 
for civilizing subjects into citizens (Brown, 2009). The fetishization of the 
state would reach its peak with the fascist turn in Japanese politics in the 
1930s. 
In Korea, already in the 1890s the government undertook reforms with 
an eye on the creation of an egalitarian society of citizens (or inmin, people-
replaced, since then, by simin, closer in meaning to the bourgeoisie and, by 
extension, civil society, urban in its connotations) (Hwang, 2004). Following 
annexation by Japan by 1910, citizenship would assume an anti-colonial 
orientation, which also favored the collective national goal over the individual. 
Since the Korean War, when the country was split, North Korea has been 
ruled by an authoritarian Communist Party. Despite “democratiza-tion” 
under US tutelage, South Korea, too, for four decades would remain under 
authoritarian military rule. 
In the case of China, the articulation of citizenship rights in the early 
twentieth century was preceded by half a century of legal and diplomatic 
developments that insistently brought up the question of the mutual 
obligations and responsibilities of state and society, the fundamental premise 
of any idea or practice of citizenship. Prominent in these developments 
initially was the protection of and, to a lesser extent, demands for protection 
made by Chinese Overseas. In the new diplomatic situation defined by 
international law, the ability to protect Chinese abroad served as a test of 
Qing claims to sovereignty. Both Qing officials and the Chinese Overseas 
acted out, or exercised, some of the prerogatives associated with citizenship 
before the term itself entered the official language of politics around the turn 
of the twentieth century (Chen, 1984: 1-4). 
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The new nationalist politics in China emerging around this time 
signaled the beginnings of a long revolution that would culminate in another 
revolutionary transformation in 1949. Nationalism made intolerable the rule 
of the ethnic minority Qing government, opposition to which would end up 
putting an end to the monarchy as well. But the project that drove reformers 
and revolutionaries was to make public-minded citizens out of a population 
oriented to private, family goals. The intervention of the state, led by an elite, 
was necessary for the creation of a nation out of “a pan of loose sand,” as Sun 
Yat-sen famously put it. When the Guomindang (Nationalist or Citizens’ 
Party) came into power in the 1930s, it resisted constitutionalism on the 
grounds that the first order of business was “tutelage” of the people, built into 
Sun Yat-sen’s program of national development. Making good Communist 
citizens, first revolutionary and presently capitalist, has also been a priority of 
the Communist Party of China. In all cases, we may add, citizenship has also 
been conceived in ethnic terms. Both in Japan and China, especially the latter 
with a complex ethnic composition, citizenship has been prejudicial toward 
ethnic minorities who, in addition to learning to be citizens, also have had to 
cope with demands for assimilation to the ways of the majority (Friedman, 
2004). Even then, citizens’ rights have not been guaranteed. 
This authoritarian conception of the citizenship covers only part of the 
story. The conversion of subjects into citizens also had radical consequences 
in enabling a new politics that drew its legitimacy from belonging in the 
nation. People’s Rights movements in Japan in the 1880s were succeeded by 
strong labor and socialist movements that in the end could be overcome only 
through fascist suppression. The latter also should be noted for its advocacy 
of social citizenship, which to some extent had priority over political or civil 
citizenship. Struggles for citizenship have continued since World War II, now 
under a democratic society put in place through US intervention (Bowen, 
1980; Gordon, 1988, 1992; Sasaki-Uemura, 2002). 
Similarly with Chinese and Korean struggles for citizens’ rights. Under 
colonial circumstances, nationalism in Korea took a cultural turn, fostering a 
cultural citizenship that was also productive of social and civil concerns. In 
South Korea, struggles for citizenship turned after the Korean War to 
challenges to the rule of military dictators, pushing the boundaries of citizens’ 
participation in politics, and expanding the realm of democracy (Robinson, 
1988; Cumings, 2005: Ch. 7). Most recent, and notable, was the minjung 
(literally, masses, or people, with all the positive connotations of the latter) 
movement of the 1980s, that played an important part in the turn from 
dictatorship to democracy. The spirit of struggle was visible once again in the 
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late 1990s protests against IMF imposed austerity measures in the wake of the 
Asian economic crisis. It has gradually receded, however, as the people 
themselves have been coopted into the development (or consumer)
citizenship that is discussed by Chang Kyung-sup in his contribution to this 
volume.
But it was in China that the struggles for citizenship would have the 
most profound revolutionary consequences as they drew in ever larger 
constituencies until, by the 1930s, both urban and rural populations, men 
and women, Han and minorities, participated or were caught up in the 
revolutionary movement. While the revolutionary movement reads as a tale 
of two parties (the Guomindang and the Communist Party), social 
constituencies (intellectuals, urban business, women and workers) played a 
prominent part of their own in taking the initiative in the pursuit of citizens’ 
rights which, consequently, acquired civic, cultural and social dimensions in 
addition to the demands for political participation (Edwards, 2008). The 
political significance of socialism also made class into a significant issue of 
citizenship. As might be expected from the twists and turns in the revolution 
over the course of the twentieth century, both the content and the boundaries 
of citizenship shifted over time. Successive Chinese constitutions following 
the founding of the Republic in 1911 lodged sovereignty in the people, and, 
under Guomindang rule in the 1930s, recognized the equality of all citizens 
before the law regardless of gender, religion or class. The promise of equality 
under conditions of glaring inequality nevertheless guaranteed challenges to 
the state under the revolutionary circumstances of Chinese society. The shifts 
in the meaning of citizenship are visible in the changing relationship between 
the terms guomin (citizen/national), renmin (people, with changing 
inclusions based on class), and gongmin (citizen/member of civil society), 
and the different meanings assigned to these terms in law and popular usage 
(Xin, 2004).
The case of Taiwan (The Republic of China) provides an additional, and 
interesting perspective on citizenship in the contrasts it offers to developments 
on the Mainland. Like Korea, Taiwan was a Japanese colony for half a century, 
and was “democratized” under US supervision after World War II, when the 
Guomindang government was forced to relocate on the island with 
Communist victory on the Mainland. Also similar was its experience with 
dictatorship and democracy, which was bound up with regional and extra-
regional developments. The political division of the country served for three 
decades as the justification for Guomindang dictatorship. As in the case of 
South Korea,  popular social movements would bring down the dictatorship 
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by the late 1980s. Unlike in South Korea, however, the social movements for 
citizenship were coupled with calls for an autonomous sovereign state, based 
on a local Taiwanese identity that was as much a product of the colonial past 
as it is of affinities with the Chinese Mainland. The issue of sovereignty has 
been a contentious one. But there is little question that the struggles of the 
1980s for citizenship played a central role in placing it on the political agenda, 
possibly irretrievably-the first time in Chinese history that a citizens’ struggle 
drawing legitimacy from constitutional rights has played a leading part in 
shaping the state (Chuang, 2010). 
Attention to the part the idea of citizenship played in the expansion of 
popular rights in all three states also brings into relief the ends served by the 
invocation of traditions in all three societies — from the insertion of the 
familial metaphor in the Meiji constitution in response to the People’s Rights 
movement of the 1880s, to the Confucian revival under the Guomindang in 
the 1930s and again in the PRC since the 1980s, to a similar revival in Korea 
under the Park Chung Hee regime in Korea in the 1970s. This is not to paint 
Confucianism with the brush of modern dictatorship, for there are other 
versions of Confucianism more in keeping with everyday kinship and social 
values, which are cherished by at least some parts of the populations, in 
which keeping the state at a distance is a primary goal. What the two have in 
common is a desire to restrain the more individualistic elements in liberal 
ideas of citizenship, or social citizenship that shifts kinship prerogatives to the 
state (Kim, 2007). Still, there is a big difference between the social desire to 
instill some native values into citizenship (which does not distinguish China 
from many other societies), and to deploy the past in binding citizens to the 
state, and making the dispensation of citizenship rights a state prerogative. 
The confusion of the two, intentional or otherwise, has played into the hands 
of the state, intensifying control of society by the state apparatus, including its 
corporate arms.
The Present
Juridical citizenship is well-established in East Asian societies but 
citizenship remains an unfinished project. As in the past, citizenship faces 
problems similar to those of other societies, but under local conditions of 
which the century long history of citizenship is an integral part. Some 
problems are long-standing ones. Chief among these problems is the 
fulfillment of the promise of citizenship, evident in continued struggles. 
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While in the democratic societies of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan such 
struggles take the form of expansion of rights, in others such as the PRC and 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea even political citizenship remains 
a distant goal. To make matters more difficult, some of these rights have 
become even more difficult to achieve under conditions of global 
neoliberalism, especially those rights associated with social citizenship. In the 
PRC, where the socialist regime gave priority to the social over other 
dimensions of citizenship, there has been a retreat from those rights as well as 
the national economy has been incorporated in global capitalism (Liu, 2007; 
Solinger, 1999; Yan, 2008). One author, critical of the regime, has gone so far 
as to attribute the rapid development of the past two decades to a “low 
human rights” regime that has lowered “transaction costs” by denial of civic 
and political rights (Qin, 2009).
Still other problems are products of the current global environment. 
Chang Kyung-sup (2010) points to the replacement of struggles for citizenship 
with a “developmental citizenship” that leads to popular acquiescence in state 
policies so long as the state delivers on the promise of economic 
development, however inimical that may be to long-term political and social 
welfare. What we might call “consumer citizenship” (Perry, 2006) has also 
contributed to the valorization of private consumption activities over public 
concerns — in the aftermath of the Tiananmen tragedy in 1989, steering 
people away from politics by encouraging consumption through rapid 
development was one of the stated aims of rapid incorporation in global 
capitalism in the PRC in the 1990s (Davis, 2000; Dirlik, 2001; Qin, 2009: 86). 
Finally, East Asian societies, like societies around the world, have to 
contend with questions of national identity raised by increasing numbers of 
immigrants as well as emigrants (UN, 2003; Cornelius, 2004: Chs. 11-12; 
Kim, 2004). While immigrants are still relatively small in numbers, the 
insistence on ethnic purity in all of these societies gives the problem a 
particular urgency. And the problem is likely to gain in seriousness, as the 
needs for immigrant labor put increasing pressure on ethnically exclusive 
assumptions of nationality and citizenship. Even the highly controlled PRC 
has pockets of undocumented immigrant communities, reminiscent of 
trading communities in coastal cities like Guangzhou during imperial times 
(He, 2010). At the same time, in the PRC in particular, there is also a migrant 
population that is increasingly transnational in orientation. One study 
suggests that Chinese emigrants in Japan prefer resident permits to 
citizenship because while they would lose their Chinese citizenship if they 
became Japanese, a residency permit allows them to retain their Chinese 
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citizenship, while participating in local citizenship in Japan (Liu-Farber, 
2009). While it seems that in an immediate sense only Japan needs to cope 
with the challenge such immigrants present, the PRC, too, will sooner or later 
have to face the problem of reconciling a transnational identity with the 
juridical requirements of citizenship.
These are but a few of the problems of a global nature that East Asian 
societies face. While some citizens of East Asian societies enjoy multiple 
citizenships if only symbolically (such as “Green Citizenship,” for instance), 
and have access to multiple dimensions of citizenship, others suffers from a 
multiplicity of inequalities, from ethnic, gender and class to urban-rural 
inequalities. Immigrants, documented or undocumented, suffer from the 
lack of juridical protections extended to citizens; in the case of the People’s 
Republic of China, this includes rural immigrants into the cities. The various 
societies of the region would seem to be experimenting with these global 
problems of citizenship in their own ways with varying degrees of commitment 
and effectiveness (Chia, 2006; Choe, 2006; He, 2005; Pak, 2000). Citizenship 
is in flux in East Asia as it would seem to be everywhere. It remains to be seen 
how it is reconfigured in response to these problems, and the complications 
they have introduced into those inherited from the past. State management 
and citizenship struggles continue to play out their contradictions, and to 
produce new definitions of citizenship. Incorporation in global capitalism 
would seem to favor a flexible state to go with flexible citizenship, or vice 
versa, but for some causes and some of the citizens but not for others (Ong, 
1999, 2003). The distancing of the state from the nation is more likely also to 
favor management over representation in the relationship between the two — 
which makes the struggle for rights more urgent than ever.     
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